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INTRODUCTION: LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE 
DISASTER CYCLE, AND THE FUKUSHIMA 
ACCIDENT 
 
DANIEL A. FARBER† 
There is no gainsaying the importance of the subject of this 
Symposium. Year after year, disasters exact a toll on our society. This 
Symposium marks significant advances in our understanding of the 
legal system’s role in managing disaster risks. 
The figures are sobering. According to a nationwide database of 
U.S. disaster losses, disaster costs have averaged twelve billion dollars 
per year over the past half-century.1 From 1980 through 2004, the U.S. 
experienced sixty-two weather events causing an average of a billion 
dollars or more in damages.2 Averages, however, are misleading—
Hurricane Katrina alone caused about $100 billion in direct damage.3 
Losses are highly skewed, with the top twenty percent of the most 
destructive events accounting for eighty percent of the damages.4  
These mega-disasters pose unique challenges to the legal system. 
This Symposium reflects an increasing recognition of the role the 
legal system plays in disaster prevention, response, and recovery.5  
 
 †   Dan Farber is the Sho Sato Professor of Law and chair of the Energy and Resources 
Group at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also the Co-Director of the Center for 
Law, Energy, and the Environment. Professor Farber serves on the editorial board of 
Foundation Press, is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and is a Life 
Member of the American Law Institute. In addition, he is the editor of Issues in Legal 
Scholarship. 
 1.  Carolyn Kousky, Informing Climate Adaptation: A Review of the Economic Costs of 
Natural Disasters, Their Determinants, and Risk Reduction Options 14 (Res. for the Future 
Discussion Paper No. 12-28, 2012). Kousky discusses the data and methodological issues 
involved in such estimates in detail. Id. at 11–13. 
 2.  JAMES F. MISKEL, DISASTER RESPONSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY: WHAT WORKS, 
WHAT DOESN’T 25 (Stanford Security Studies 2008) (2006) (citing Nat’l Climatic Data Ctr., 
Billion Dollar Weather/Climate Disasters, NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html#chron (last updated Apr. 24, 2012)). 
 3.  Id. at 99. 
 4.  Kousky, supra note 1, at 16. 
 5.  For a discussion of these issues, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER, JIM CHEN, ROBERT 
R.M. VERCHICK, & LISA GROW SUN, DISASTER LAW AND POLICY (2d ed. 2010). 
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Since Hurricane Katrina, which revealed a disturbing lack of 
preparation to handle disasters, a growing community of scholars has 
focused on disaster law. This emerging legal field seeks to inform and 
improve disaster-related decisionmaking, as evidenced by a spate of 
recent books6 and a rapidly expanding number of law review articles 
on the subject.7 
This Symposium features prominent examples of legal 
scholarship’s ability to illuminate—and hopefully help to reform—the 
network of legal rules and institutions that deals with disaster risks. 
We can learn a great deal about the nature of this network and about 
the significance of the Symposium contributions by considering the 
events surrounding the Fukushima meltdown. 
In this Introduction, I will put the Symposium articles in context 
by setting them within the disaster cycle, as exemplified by the recent 
Fukushima disaster. The disaster cycle provides a unifying framework 
for disaster law. I will begin by explaining the disaster cycle and its 
significance for understanding disaster policy. I will then go through 
the major stages of the cycle, showing how the Symposium articles 
help illuminate the situation facing Japan after the Fukushima 
accident. 
I. THE DISASTER CYCLE AS A UNIFYING FRAMEWORK 
As shown by the following figure, the disaster cycle delineates a 
set of strategies including mitigation, emergency response, 
compensation, and rebuilding, with rebuilding completing the circle 
by including (or failing to include) mitigation measures:8 
 
 6. See, e.g., id.; ENVTL. LAW INST., LOSING GROUND: A NATION ON EDGE (John R. 
Nolon & Daniel B. Rodriguez eds., 2007); ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD (2010); NAN D. HUNTER, THE LAW 
OF EMERGENCIES: PUBLIC HEALTH AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT (2009). 
 7.  We can get some sense of the expansion from a Westlaw search for ti(“flood 
insurance” “levees”  “oil spill” “forest fire” “natural disaster”). For 2000–2005, the search 
produced 23 documents; for 2007–2012, the search produced 131 documents (search of JLR 
database on Aug. 1, 2012). A search for “Hurricane Katrina” in the same database on August 1, 
2012 produced 3997 documents, of which 128 had the term in their titles. 
 8.  FARBER ET AL., supra note 5, at 3. 
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Fig 1. The Cycle of Disaster Law.9 
 
Each stage of the circle of disaster—mitigation, emergency 
response, insurance/liability compensation, rebuilding—is part of 
society’s risk management portfolio. In the popular mind, the focus 
may be on the drama of the disaster itself and the immediate 
emergency response. But this focus can be quite misleading. 
In reality, the emergency response is only one part of the risk 
management portfolio. Each stage of the disaster cycle offers 
opportunities to reduce the social costs of disasters. If we begin in the 
lower corner of the figure, mitigation efforts attempt to lessen the 
potential impact of disaster events before disaster strikes. Successes 
and failures at this stage can spell the difference between a routine 
disruption and a major catastrophe. As early as Rousseau, scholars 
understood the connection between land-use decisions and disaster 
impacts.10 The significance of the emergency response needs no 
explanation. After the emergency has passed, insurance, tort law, and 
government disaster assistance provide ways of spreading and shifting 
risks. When we cannot (or simply do not) mitigate risks before the 
 
 9.  Verchick’s version of this chart is similar but uses slightly different phrasing and omits 
the event itself as a node. See Robert R.M. Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human 
Capability, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 23, 27 fig.1 (2012). 
 10.  See Verchick, supra note 9, at 32 (discussing Rousseau’s letter to Voltaire which 
argued, in part, that if the population of Lisbon had been more uniformly distributed when the 
earthquake of 1755 struck, “the damage would have been much less”) (quoting Russell R. 
Dynes, The Dialogue between Voltaire and Rousseau on the Lisbon Earthquake: The Emergence 
of a Social Scientific View, 18 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 97, 106 (2000)). 
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event, or avoid them through swift response afterwards, these 
compensation mechanisms can help blunt the impact and prepare for 
reconstruction or rebuilding. Rebuilding has significance in its own 
right, but in some sense it is also just the beginning of a new cycle—
inasmuch as it incorporates mitigation efforts for the next disaster 
down the road. 
The cycle would have limited interest if it merely represented a 
chronology of unrelated events and actions. But complex interactions 
and structures characterize both the disaster cycle and its 
components. Risk mitigation involves a sub-cycle of interconnected 
strategies, while disaster response involves careful institutional design 
that takes place before the event, and recovery involves the interplay 
between funding mechanisms (some private, some state or federal) 
and local government efforts. Other fields of law may touch on parts 
of the puzzle (e.g., state and local government law, insurance law, 
land use law, tort law), but miss the larger picture that is incorporated 
into the concept of the disaster cycle. 
An advantage of using the disaster cycle as a framework is that 
the emergency response, which usually gets the lions’ share of 
attention, is put into context. Risk mitigation failures often contribute 
to the impact of the later disaster, turning an otherwise manageable 
event into a more serious risk to life or property, or amplifying what 
would otherwise be a less significant risk to calamitous proportions. 
Post-emergency compensation mechanisms and rebuilding are as 
important as the emergency response in determining the severity of 
the impact on many victims. 
The disaster cycle is also important because no one stage can be 
considered in isolation. For instance, the appropriate degree of risk 
mitigation may depend on expectations about emergency response. If 
project planners assume that a disaster will lead to successful 
evacuation, they will downplay potential risks to life in their planning. 
On the other hand, if disaster responders assume that risk mitigation 
will be successful, they will make less of an investment in planning for 
an emergency response, and the response will focus on those risks 
that could not be effectively mitigated in advance. Similarly, if 
insurance coverage is universal, project planners will not have to 
consider risk aversion in choosing mitigation measures, and they may 
find it less important to invest in preventing certain kinds of property 
harm. 
Finally, the disaster cycle is illuminating simply because the loop 
is closed. It is always tempting to downplay the risk of future disasters 
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after a disaster has taken place. For instance, we might like to believe 
that the U.S. Gulf Coast will never be hit by another Katrina or BP 
oil spill, or that Fukushima was a unique example of a severe natural 
disaster impacting a nuclear power plant. But risks of this kind do not 
disappear. Every disaster merely begins the cycle again, calling for a 
new round of risk mitigation. 
As we will see, the Fukushima disaster involved serious problems 
at every stage of the cycle. The articles in this Symposium provide a 
source of insight at each of these stages. I will begin with the issue of 
risk mitigation before the event. The outlines of the disaster are 
commonly known, but more details will be developed in the course of 
discussing the emergency response. Proceeding clockwise through the 
disaster cycle illustrated in the figure above, I will then briefly discuss 
the compensation and insurance issues, and what we can foresee in 
terms of rebuilding after Fukushima. At each stage, the Symposium 
contributions are relevant, highlighting failures at Fukushima or 
pointing toward future reforms. 
II. RISK MITIGATION 
The most effective emergency response is that which is never 
needed because the emergency is forestalled. However well-executed 
an emergency response might be, it is always better if there is no 
emergency to respond to, or if a disaster is small rather than large. As 
we will see, the Fukushima accident involved some serious lapses in 
risk assessment and risk management, and the articles in the 
Symposium help shed light on these issues. 
The damage wrought by a natural event—extreme weather or 
earthquakes, for example—is linked with human agency and 
manipulation of the natural environment, both at the site of the 
disaster itself and more generally due to anthropogenic climate 
change. It is almost a cliché in the field that there is no such thing as a 
truly natural disaster. Physical “phenomena are a necessary 
component of risk, but they are only the starting point in addressing 
safety concerns”—to be fully effective, the work of calculating and 
planning for disaster risk must account for “acts of nature, . . . 
weaknesses of human nature, and . . . side effects of technology.”11  
Therefore, the study of disaster must arguably begin with a definition 
of the term “disaster” as an event with both natural and artificial  
 
 11.  Daniel A. Farber, Robert G. Bea, Karlene Roberts, Edward Wenk & Kofi Inkabi, 
Reinventing Flood Control, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1085, 1089–90 (2006). 
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(human-induced) causes, or perhaps with solely artificial causes, as in 
the case of terrorism events. 
The Fukushima accident is a prime example of how risk 
mitigation failures and natural events interact with horrendous 
results. During the Fukushima nuclear crisis, government officials and 
industry representatives said that the tsunami that struck the reactors 
was beyond imagination, thus excusing their failure to consider such a 
risk in the planning process.12 As it turns out, there actually had been 
warnings about the possibility of a tsunami of this magnitude, but the 
warnings were ignored.13 
The reactors were situated on a small bluff, which was thought to 
provide sufficient protection from tsunamis.14 History indicated 
otherwise. There is a historical record of a huge tsunami in July of 869 
and geological evidence indicating a thousand-year return cycle.15 
Indeed, in 2008, experts at TEPCO (the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company) had performed some preliminary modeling suggesting that 
the tsunami hazard was much greater than its previous estimate.16 
Until 2006, the government did not even discuss tsunamis in its safety 
guidelines, and even then it insisted that the “robust sealed 
containment structure around the reactor itself would prevent any 
damage to the nuclear part of the reactor from a tsunami . . . No 
radiological hazard would be likely.”17 
This confidence in seismological safety would have been hard to 
support even when the statement was made, but within a year it 
would be definitively rebutted. On July 16, 2007, an earthquake 
damaged the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant. The 
designers had used the historical record and added a margin of 
safety—but still reached only forty percent of the actual quake 
 
 12.  Rodney C. Ewing & Jeroen Ritsema, Underestimating Nuclear Accident Risks: Why 
Are Rare Events So Common?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/fukushima-what-dont-we-know. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  James M. Acton & Mark Hibbs, Why Fukushima was Preventable, THE CARNEGIE 
PAPERS, Mar. 2012, at 1, 13 (citing Jin Nishikawa & Eisuke Sasaki, TEPCO Warned of Big 
Tsunami 4 Days Prior to March 11, THE ASAHI SHIMBUN: ASIA & JAPAN WATCH (Aug. 25, 
2011), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/quake_tsunami/AJ201108257639), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventable. 
 17.  Charles Perrow, Fukushima, Risk, and Probability: Expect the Unexpected, BULL. 
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 2011), http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/fukushima-risk-
and-probability-expect-the-unexpected. 
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strength.18 Apparently, what they thought were three small faults 
were actually part of one large fault.19 The accident also involved 
unforeseen mechanisms of harm. One company official said, “It was 
beyond our imagination that a space could be made in the hole on the 
outer wall for the electric cables.”20 This event should have been a 
warning about the unreliability of seismic predictions, the potential 
for unprecedented harm mechanisms, and the need to widen 
“imagination” beyond the comfort zone of well-documented risks. 
Yet officials and industry continued as if they had a full 
understanding of all the risks, rather than realizing the need for 
additional precaution. 
Some investigators reported that the earthquake, even without 
the supposedly unexpected tsunami, had been enough to trigger fuel 
meltdowns at Fukushima.21 Whether the cause was the earthquake 
itself or the subsequent tsunami, company and government officials 
were surely on notice of the dangers of overconfidence and the 
potential for severe events outside of recent historical experience. 
Flaws in the regulatory structure may have further fostered the 
officials’ complacency before Fukushima. Critics point to the 
“extremely fragmented” nature of the Japanese nuclear regulatory 
system.22 They also point to the “close rapport between officials and 
industry”—as exemplified by the fact that “thirteen former high-
ranking bureaucrats were members of the boards of directors in the 
power companies.”23 The head of the regulatory commission held a 
university chair endowed by TEPCO and may have received research 
grants from the company.24 
The cozy relationship between the industry and regulators may 
have contributed to complacency and overconfidence about the 
future and the corresponding failure to anticipate the severity of 
future disaster risks. But these problems are far from being unique to 
 
 18.   Ashwin Kumar & M.V. Ramana, Nuclear Safety Lessons from Japan’s Summer 
Earthquake, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Dec. 4, 2007), http://www.thebulletin.org/web-
edition/features/nuclear-safety-lessons-japans-summer-earthquake. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Verchick, supra note 9, at 37. 
 22.  Akira Nakamura & Masao Kikuchi, What We Know, and What We Have Not Yet 
Learned: Triple Disasters and the Fukushima Nuclear Fiasco in Japan, 71 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
893, 897 (2011). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
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Fukushima or to Japanese regulators. We can readily find examples 
closer to home. 
In his contribution to this Symposium, Dan Tarlock points to a 
similar failure of risk assessment in terms of U.S. flood control policy 
and law. He argues that U.S. flood policies are out of sync with 
climate change, which will amplify future risks outside of historic 
patterns.25 Among other reforms, he seconds the EU Flood 
Directive’s call for scenario planning, including consideration of low-
probability extreme events, medium-probability events, and routine 
events.26 
When a disaster proves that risk assessments and mitigation 
methods were inadequate, reforms such as those that Tarlock 
recommends would seem necessary. Again, Fukushima is an apt 
example. Regulatory failure was part of the Fukushima story. Experts 
point to a “growing body of evidence that suggests the accident was 
the result of failures in regulation and nuclear plant design and that 
both were lagging behind international best practices and 
standards.”27 Not surprisingly, following the Fukushima accident, 
“there has been much more extensive domestic and international 
criticism of the Japanese regulatory system.”28 But whether real 
reform will result is unclear. 
The political dynamics of post-disaster reform efforts can be 
complex. The Symposium article by Tom McGarity and Rena 
Steinzor examines the dynamics of post-disaster reform in the context 
of the contemporary United States.29 They focus on a case study of 
coal ash retention ponds and a 2008 disaster in Tennessee. Calling the 
Tennessee event a “preventable disaster,” they explore the 
catastrophe, EPA’s failure to anticipate and prevent it, and EPA’s 
tepid response to it.30 We will return to this issue in Part IV. But first 
we need to consider the intermediate portions of the disaster cycle, 
beginning with the emergency response. 
 
 25.  A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete Transition from 
the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151, 171–76   
(2012). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Acton & Hibbs, supra note 16, at 3. 
 28.  Id. at 24. 
 29.  See generally Thomas O. McGarity & Rena I. Steinzor, The End Game of 
Deregulation: Myopic Risk Management and the Next Catastrophe, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 93  (2012). 
 30.  Id. 
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III. THE DISASTER AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE PHASES 
Center stage in a disaster story is always taken by the event itself 
and the emergency response. This section opens with a description of 
the Fukushima disaster and response. Although officials undoubtedly 
tried to do as well as they could under extremely difficult 
circumstances, the response fell short in key respects. We will 
consider some of the specific issues relating to the emergency 
response that are illuminated by articles in the Symposium. 
A. The Unfolding Fukushima Disaster and Emergency Response 
We begin with the natural disaster preceding the reactor failures. 
On March 11, 2011, in an event that is now known in Japan as 3/11, a 
9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the east coast of Japan, about 
one-hundred miles east-northeast of Fukushima and two-hundred 
miles northeast of Tokyo.31 The earthquake triggered a large tsunami 
that overwhelmed seawalls and contributed to massive destruction.32 
As a direct result of the earthquake and tsunami, over 15,000 people 
were killed and 340,000 were displaced.33 The tsunami and earthquake 
struck quickly, but other portions of the disaster were only beginning 
to unfold. 
During the earthquake, the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power 
station lost outside power—the station no longer had a connection to 
the electrical grid. Backup diesel generators came on to supply the 
missing power needed to maintain the cooling system. The Dai-ni 
plant did not lose power but did face degraded safety systems.34 
About forty-six minutes after the quake, the first waves of an 
enormous tsunami reached the Fukushima Dai-ichi power station.35 
The tsunami measured about forty-five feet high at the Dai-ichi 
 
 31.  Magnitude 9.0 – Near the East Coast of Honshu, Japan, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
(Mar. 11, 2011, 05:46:24 UTC), http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/ 
usc0001xgp/. 
 32.  Norimitsu Onishi, Seawalls Offered Little Protection Against Tsunami’s Crushing 
Waves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2011, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14 
/world/asia/14seawalls.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn. 
 33.  Katherine Harmon, Japan’s Post-Fukushima Earthquake Health Woes Go Beyond 
Radiation Effects, SCI. AM., Mar. 2, 2012, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id= 
japans-post-fukushima-earthquake-health-woes-beyond-radiation 
 34.  INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, MISSION REPORT: THE GREAT EAST JAPAN 
EARTHQUAKE EXPERT MISSION 20 (2011), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/ 
Meetings/PDFplus/2011/cn200/documentation/cn200_Final-Fukushima-Mission_Report.pdf. 
 35.  Id. 
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power station.36 This four-story high wall of water overwhelmed the 
eighteen-foot seawall and knocked out emergency generators.37 An 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report provides a vivid 
sense of the post-tsunami state of the nuclear plant, detailing how the 
tsunami “caused widespread destruction of many buildings, doors, 
roads, tanks and other site infrastructure.”38 
At that point, the emergency response phase began. According 
to the IAEA, the “operators were faced with a catastrophic, 
unprecedented emergency scenario with no power, reactor control or 
instrumentation, and in addition, severely affected communications 
systems both within and external to the site.”39 As a result, the reactor 
operators had to struggle “in darkness with almost no 
instrumentation and control systems to secure the safety of six 
reactors, six nuclear fuel pools, a common fuel pool and dry cask 
storage facilities.”40 
The severity of the earthquake and tsunami would have 
challenged any response system.41 Perhaps understandably, the 
response to the disaster was confused and disorganized. For instance, 
a utility employee missed the fact that a key valve in Unit 1’s backup 
cooling unit was closed, thinking instead that the absence of steam 
meant there was no cooling water.42 Consequently, the cooling system 
was shut down for three hours.43 Confusion also existed at much 
higher levels of responsibility. Since “there was no comprehensive 
disaster-management plan,” the prime minister “had to improvise, 
which often involved yelling at regulators and Tepco executives.”44 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
   38.  Id. at 12. The operators suffered under great handicaps in responding to the crisis: 
 The extreme difficulties that the operators on the site had to face in Fukushima 
Dai-ichi have to be once again strongly underlined: loss of all the safety systems, 
loss of practically all the instrumentation, necessity to cope with simultaneous 
severe accidents on four plants, lack of human resources, lack of equipment, lack 
of light in the installations, and general conditions of the installation after the 
tsunami and after damage of the fuel resulted in hydrogen explosions and high 
levels of radiation.  
Id. at 43. 
 39.  Id. at 12. 
 40.  Id. at 40. 
 41.  THE AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y SPECIAL COMM. ON FUKUSHIMA, FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI 
(2012). 
     42.   Yoichi Funabashi & Kay Kitazawa, Fukushima in Review: A Complex Disaster, A 
Disastrous Response, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2012, at 9, 11. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Japan After the 3/11 Disaster, The Death of Trust, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2012, at 35, 38. 
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The crisis rapidly worsened. The offsite emergency control 
center was inoperable because of earthquake and tsunami damage as 
well as a lack of protections such as air-purification.45 Explosions 
occurred at Units 1 through 4; the explosions at Units 1 through 3 
were caused by a build-up of hydrogen while the cause for the 
explosion at Unit 4 still remains unclear.46 Because it was at a slightly 
higher elevation and was air-cooled (so it did not need cooling 
water),47 diesel generators at Unit 6 remained functional in the 
aftermath of the tsunami, and workers were able to use the power to 
achieve a cold shutdown at Units 5 and 6.48 Emergency Situations 
were declared for both the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Fukushima Dai-ni 
power stations, resulting in evacuations and emergency measures.49 
With the evacuation and emergency measures, a new set of issues 
took the forefront. These issues related to the relationship between 
the officials managing the emergency and the public—first, the 
officials’ efforts to manage the public response, and second, the 
officials’ failure to adequately provide for the special needs of 
portions of disadvantaged groups. These issues are discussed in the 
next two subsections. 
B. Managing the Public Response 
As the evacuation measures illustrate, emergency responses 
involve not only physical and technological measures, but also 
management of the public’s behavior. Those responses are partly 
shaped by expectations about public behavior—expectations that are 
often distorted. 
These distortions are the subject of Lisa Sun’s Symposium article 
about disaster myths and the process that perpetuates these myths.50  
As she points out, 
 
 45.  Id. 
      46.     THE AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y SPECIAL COMM. ON FUKUSHIMA, supra note 41, at 11-12. 
 47.   Id. at 10. 
 48.   Id. Cold shutdown is achieved after several days once the reactor is no longer critical 
(temperatures below 200° F)—even after the cooling rods are inserted and fission stops, the 
radioactive products continue to generate significant heat. 
 49.  For the May 17 update of the TEPCO Roadmap towards Restoration, see Current 
Status of Roadmap, TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER CO., http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-
com/release/betu11_e/images/110517e3.pdf. 
 50.  Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and Availability Cascades, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 73, 74 (2012). 
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[D]isaster sociologists [have] identified several important 
public misconceptions about typical human behavior in the 
aftermath of disasters. These misconceptions—also called 
“disaster myths”—include (1) the myth that widespread 
antisocial behavior, such as violence and looting, is common 
after disasters; (2) the myth that most disaster survivors will 
panic and engage in irrational flight behavior; and (3) the 
myth that disaster survivors commonly suffer a shock 
reaction that paralyzes them and interferes with their ability 
to respond to the disaster and care for themselves and 
others.51 
These disaster myths distorted responses during the Fukushima 
crisis and led to a lack of transparency that, in the end, only created 
distrust. 
During the Fukushima event, TEPCO “played down the extent 
of the calamity, and initial reports avoided using the term 
‘meltdown,’” that phrase surfaced only much later.52 Information 
about radioactivity was “partly held back to avoid causing panic.”53  
For a couple of days after the accident, the officials were “driven by a 
fear that public disclosures of radiation levels would cause 
widespread panic.”54 Unfortunately, this tactic backfired. “Lacking 
real information from the Japanese government, the media quickly 
focused on Chernobyl as a convenient comparison for predicting 
fallout deposition and radiation health effects.”55 Ironically, when 
TEPCO did release information five days after the accident, it was 
alarmist and inaccurate. Consequently, “[w]hat little confidence that 
the international community and media had in reports coming from 
the Japanese authorities evaporated, and speculation ran rampant.”56 
Even before the accident, fear of public response was a problem 
in emergency planning. In order to avoid causing “unnecessary 
anxiety and misunderstanding,” a drill involving an earthquake and 
nuclear accident was cancelled, and instead the prefecture held an 
emergency drill for heavy snow.57 
 
 51.  Id. at 74–75 (internal citations omitted). 
 52.  Nakamura & Kakuchi, supra note 22, at 897. 
 53.  Japan after the 3/11 Disaster, supra note 44. 
 54.  Funabashi & Kitazawa, supra note 43, at 18. 
 55.  THE AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y SPECIAL COMM. ON FUKUSHIMA, supra note 41, at 31. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Funabashi & Kitazawa, supra note 43, at 14. 
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These efforts to submerge information about risks ultimately 
backfired and led to more public distrust. Professor Sun suggests 
some avenues for reducing the influence of disaster myths, such as the 
spread of disaster mythology. This influence can perhaps be mitigated 
by changing the incentives of “availability entrepreneurs” who might 
otherwise perpetuate the myth. Options include hiring more educated 
emergency managers to advise local officials in disaster 
decisionmaking and creating targeted public information 
campaigns—particularly campaigns aimed at young people.58 
Sun’s specific proposals are aimed at the special problems posed 
by the myth of post-disaster crime. For instance, involving more 
educated emergency managers in decisionmaking would help reduce 
the fear of panic among decisionmakers. In addition to Sun’s 
proposals, it might also be worth considering changing the incentives 
of decisionmakers by creating liability against them individually or 
against the government generally for failing to reveal reliable 
information during the course of the response. 
C. Disaggregating the Public 
Planning for emergency response requires particular attention to 
the needs of vulnerable populations. Poverty, old age, and disability 
can heighten an individual’s vulnerability to catastrophic loss. In the 
case of Fukushima, sixty-five percent of the deaths involved 
individuals who were over sixty years old.59 Such individuals often 
possess limited or no access to the economic and social resources 
necessary for self-care and self-rescue during a disaster—often 
necessary when the government’s own resources are overtaxed, 
disorganized, or insufficient—and thereby are much more likely to 
suffer during a disaster.60 
 
 58.  Sun, supra note 50, at 81–92. 
 59.  Verchick, supra note 9, at 24. 
 60.  Cf. David D. Caron, Catastrophes Afflict Poor the Most, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 5, 2005, at 
B9. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, when economically and socially disadvantaged 
communities are largely composed of people of color, the disaster’s results take on even more 
epic proportions —because racial minority status and limited resources often go hand-in-hand, 
and because of the chilling effects of entrenched racism on disaster response and management. 
See Nils Gilman, What Katrina Teaches about the Meaning of Racism, June 11, 2006, 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Gilman; Christopher Edley, Jr., The New American 
Dilemma: Racial Profiling Post-9/11, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN 
AGE OF TERRORISM 170 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2003). 
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In his Symposium contribution, Rob Verchick argues that we 
need to think about “disaster” and “justice” in new ways.61 The social 
science research encourages us to think of disasters as part of the 
underlying social mechanism. Verchick provides a detailed review of 
some of the most important geographic studies of disaster and social 
vulnerability and discusses Susan Cutter’s innovative mapping 
techniques.62 He observes that Amartya Sen’s capability approach to 
evaluating human welfare suggests the need to understand disaster 
risk in terms of real-life social vulnerabilities, which helps determine 
the capabilities that individuals have to respond to and recover from 
disasters. Verchick recommends legal changes that follow from this 
insight, including a proposal for a nationwide vulnerability mapping 
system and a Disaster Justice Executive Order.63 
Disparate disaster impacts of the kind that Verchick discusses 
were present at Fukushima. The impacts of the Fukushima disaster 
were severe. The radiation risk is difficult to assess, but exposure 
could ultimately lead to anywhere from 15 to 1300 deaths, in addition 
to the roughly 600 deaths caused by the evacuation itself.64 These 
harms do not fall equally on all parts of the population. The 
evacuation deaths were predominantly caused by fatigue and 
exposure among elderly or chronically ill evacuees.65 
Physicians report that bedridden patients were hastily evacuated 
in police cars; many patients had to wait more than twenty-four hours 
before reaching medical facilities, often without heaters in Japan’s 
 
 61.  Verchick, supra note 9. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 68–71. 
 64.  Max McClure, Stanford Researchers Calculate Global Health Impacts of the Fukushima 
Nuclear Disaster, STAN. U. (July 17, 2012), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2012/july/fukushima-
health-impacts-071712.html. The evacuation was extensive: 
The central government decreed two concentric crescent-shaped zones: a 
mandatory evacuation zone and an “evacuation preparation zone.” Within the 
half-moon-shaped inner crescent twenty kilometers (twelve miles) from the 
reactors, no one is allowed to live or visit without special permission until the 
government lifts the edict. About 10,500 residents were ejected from their homes 
and businesses in this “no-go” evacuation zone. In the outer crescent twenty to 
thirty kilometers (twelve to nineteen miles) from the meltdown, a swath affecting 
almost 60,000 people, residents were told to prepare for evacuation in case of 
emergency and to stay indoors as much as possible. 
Robert B. Leflar, Ayako Hirata, Masayuki Murayama, & Shozo Ota, Human Flotsam, Legal 
Fallout: Japan’s Tsunami and Nuclear Meltdown, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107, 110 (2012) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 65.  McClure, supra note 64. 
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chilly March weather.66 The physicians’ recommendation for special 
evacuation plans of hospital inpatients and the elderly67 resonates 
with Verchick’s call for special attention to vulnerable populations. 
The mapping techniques discussed by Verchick could also be 
invaluable in emergency planning for vulnerable populations in future 
Fukushima-like situations. 
Although discrimination against the elderly receives occasional 
attention from our society, their needs have a lower profile among 
academics and activists than other vulnerable groups. One reason, at 
least in the United States, may be that our social safety net for the 
elderly is relatively strong, given the existence of Social Security and 
Medicare. But in disaster situations, the elderly “are often at higher 
risk” and clearly require attention as a disadvantaged group.68 The 
evacuation deaths at Fukushima exemplified this general trend. 
Disaster response necessarily involves on-the-ground 
improvisation to deal with unforeseen problems. Nevertheless, the 
law also plays a role in setting the stage for the emergency response. 
As illustrated by Verchick’s article, the legal system can help ensure 
appropriate organization, planning, and resources. Moreover, Sun’s 
article shows how the disaster response is marred by persistent 
errors—errors that the legal system can help reduce. Thus, although 
at first sight emergency response might seem like an area beyond the 
control of the legal system, legal scholarship has a clear capacity to 
help guide reforms. 
IV. AFTER THE DISASTER: COMPENSATION, INSURANCE, AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 
No system of risk mitigation or disaster response can prevent all 
harm. Recovery from disaster requires funding to reconstruct, 
relocate, and otherwise respond to disaster impacts. This section will 
discuss compensation systems and the problems posed by post-
disaster reconstruction, including efforts to improve risk mitigation 
before the next disaster. 
 
 66.  Koichi Tanigawa, Yoshio Hosoi, Nobuyuki Hirohashi, Yasumasa Iwasaki & Kenji 
Kamiya, Loss of Life After Evacuation: Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Accident, 379 
LANCET 889, 890 (2012). 
 67.  Id. at 890–91. 
 68.  Verchick, supra note 9, at 45. 
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A. Compensation Issues 
Post-disaster compensation to disaster victims generally takes 
one of three forms: private insurance, government aid, or the tort 
system.69 The first method of compensation is private insurance; 
however, private insurance is often unavailable or fails to provide 
prompt and efficient compensation. Significant hurdles are created by 
the frequent unavailability of separate private insurance for 
catastrophic risks, the exclusion of catastrophic risks from insurance 
coverage, and the difficulty of handling very large numbers of claims. 
The second method of compensation, litigation against responsible 
private parties, also has its limitations. These limitations include the 
need for proof of negligence or other bases for liability and limits on 
the financial assets and insurance coverage of potential defendants, 
along with other judicial doctrines limiting recovery. Third is the 
possibility of obtaining compensation from the government through 
various routes. These possibilities include tort claims against federal 
or state government for negligence (subject to immunity defenses), 
claims under special compensation schemes for particular disasters, 
and claims based on constitutional provisions requiring compensation 
for the taking (or in some states, damaging) of property.70 In the 
United States, at least, it is a mistake to speak of a “system” of 
compensation for catastrophic losses. Instead, our society has a 
makeshift assembly of jerry-rigged components, including insurance, 
tort liability, and direct government assistance. 
In their Symposium contribution, Véronique Bruggeman, 
Michael Faure, and Tobias Heldt argue that government can play a 
role in stimulating the insurability of catastrophic risks. The authors 
present arguments in favor of an active government role in 
compensation, either by acting as a primary insurer or as reinsurer of 
last resort.71 Of course, they point out, such an active role should not 
 
 69.  For a detailed discussion of these issues in a multi-national comparison, see Robert L. 
Rabin & Suzanne A. Bratis, United States, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF 
CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 303, 356 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 
2006). The remainder of the paragraph in the text presents some of their findings. 
 70.  Liability and government-supported insurance can also be combined. See W. Kip 
Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill Catastrophes: The Need 
for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717 (2011) (suggesting a combination of 
private liability and tax-supported compensation for damages that exceed the defendant’s 
financial capacity). 
 71.  Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance Against Catastrophe: 
Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F 185, 186 (2012). 
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serve to relieve injurers of liability in cases of technological accidents, 
since providing immunity would be an indirect subsidy to the risky 
activity.72 Thus, their article seems to point toward a dual system in 
which the government fosters compensation after the liable party’s 
ability to compensate is exhausted, either by providing direct financial 
support or by providing reinsurance or other support for private 
insurance.73 
Fukushima provides an apt example of the compensation 
problem. In theory, the operator of a Japanese nuclear power plant is 
strictly liable for harm, with no liability cap.74 But the reality may be 
different. The government has been afraid to let TEPCO go 
bankrupt, preferring a bailout that protects shareholders.75  Of course, 
this weakens the incentive effect of liability to induce care. In 
addition, the Japanese tort system is not geared toward producing 
prompt, full compensation. Obtaining compensation may require 
often-lengthy recourse to administrative or political processes. For 
instance, numerous victims of Minamata disease, which is caused by 
methyl-mercury poisoning, began an effort to obtain compensation in 
1957, but did not receive a judicial ruling until 1973, resulting in an 
administrative compensation system that functioned poorly.76 
Litigation was still pending as of 2009.77 
To expedite settlement in the Fukushima setting, the government 
has established a Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear 
Damage (DRC).78 The DRC is off to a slow start. 
 
 72.  Id. at 207.  
 73.  For a similar proposal in the context of oil spills, see Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 
70, at 1722–24. 
 74.  See X. Vásquez-Maignan, Fukushima: Liability and Compensation, 29.2 NEA NEWS 9, 
9 (2011) (noting that in the Japanese system, the owner of the plant where a nuclear disaster 
occurs is strictly liable for the resulting harm). There is an exception for a “grave natural 
disaster of an exceptional character,” meaning a “huge natural disaster beyond all expectations 
of humankind.” Taro Hokugo, Nuclear Liability System of Japan in Relation to the Accident at 
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plants 4 (Feb. 6, 2012), www.aec.gov.tw/www/fukushima/files 
/index_15_06.pdf. However, the government takes the position that the exception does not 
apply to Fukushima. Id. 
 75.  See Hatsuru Morita, Rescuing Victims and Rescuing TEPCO: A Legal and Political 
Analysis of the TEPCO Bailout 7–8 (March 21, 2012) (working paper), available at 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2026868. 
      76.     Eri Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in Japan, 26 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 403–07, 412 (2009). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Vásquez-Maignan, supra note 74, at 9. 
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The alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process was launched 
in September 2011. As of February 2012, however, few cases have 
been resolved through ADR. Issues that will inevitably arise in court, 
such as the extent to which cases will be tried individually or through 
mass litigation, remain to be resolved. Judicial and administrative 
precedents provide no clear answers.79 In addition, there are questions 
about the amount of compensation for victims.80  
Legal resources are also quite limited. Fukushima Prefecture has 
a population of two million, but has “only 155 attorneys and 284 shihō 
shoshi (quasi-lawyers with limited law licenses).”81 Yet local bar 
associations have shown some resistance to efforts by foreign lawyers 
to offer services.82 Moreover, there is considerable doubt among 
victims about whether TEPCO will ultimately have the assets to pay 
more than a fraction of their claims.83 
After compensation, the next step in the disaster cycle is 
reconstruction. In the Fukushima context, reconstruction involves 
decontamination. This, in itself, is a huge task. Tracking the 
radioactive contamination is a first step.84 At least a thousand square 
kilometers of land will be cleaned up, requiring disposal of fifteen to 
thirty-one million cubic meters of contaminated soil and debris.85 By 
 
 79.  Leflar et al., supra note 64, at 118 (footnote omitted) 
 80.  Leflar et al. discuss the uneven start of compensation provided by TEPCO: 
TEPCO initially responded by providing a first round of partial provisional 
compensation payments to residents displaced by government orders from the 
“no-go” inner crescent: ¥1 million (US$12,500) for households and ¥750,000 
(US$9400) for individuals. The compensation amount was recommended by the 
national government and paid by TEPCO. Businesses were eligible for 
compensation for half their demonstrated losses up to ¥2.5 million (US$31,000) 
upon submission of documentation. A second round of further compensation 
payments was announced August 4, 2011. 
Id. at 112–13 (footnotes omitted). As one local observer said about the compensation for 
business losses, “[t]here’s nothing you can do but laugh. How can business people who have lost 
everything get going again with that?” Id. at 122. 
 81.  Id. at 115 (footnote omitted). 
 82.  Id. at 118. 
 83.  Community leaders in Minami Soma articulated their concerns: 
“The question is, when we get past these partial payments and it comes time for 
TEPCO to pay the full amount of damages they owe, what kind of financial shape 
will TEPCO be in, and how much of what they owe will they be able to pay? A 
fifth? A tenth? 
Id. at 120. 
 84. For a discussion of the efforts taken to track radioactive fallout, see generally Naohiro 
Yoshida & Jota Kanda, Tracking the Fukushima Radionuclides, 336 SCI. 1115 (2012). 
 85.  Winifred Bird, As Fukushima Cleanup Begins, Long-term Impacts are Weighted, YALE 
ENVT. 360 (Jan. 9, 2012), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/as_fukushima_cleanup_begins_long-
term_impacts_are_weighed/2482/. 
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February 2012, the Japanese government had begun to distribute 
thirteen billion dollars in contracts.86 We can hope for the best in the 
rebuilding process. But rebuilding will be for naught unless better risk 
mitigation measures are in place against future disasters. 
B. Post-Disaster Mitigation Reforms 
Often, regulatory measures are strengthened from post-disaster 
response. This process has been an important factor in shaping U.S. 
environmental law. But the process may no longer be functioning 
effectively. Tom McGarity and Rena Steinzor attempt to explain why 
disasters like the Kingston spill, the BP Horizon spill, and the Upper 
Big Branch coal mine disaster no longer appear to stimulate Congress 
and EPA to initiate the sort of immediate governmental response that 
past disasters generated (such as the Exxon Valdez spill and the 
Bhopal toxic release).87 
McGarity and Steinzor attribute this shortfall in the disaster 
response to political polarization, industry dominance of the 
legislative process, and distrust of government.88 As an antidote to this 
toxic political brew, they recommend shifting authority from White 
House and Congressional overseers back to line agencies, such as the 
EPA. In addition, they recommend making a focus on corporate 
accountability central to a new narrative about the role of 
government.89 It appears to an outside observer that the Japanese 
political system, too, suffers from its own maladies. 
Suggesting cures for these political woes is far beyond the scope 
of this Introduction. Nevertheless, at the risk of merely restating the 
obvious, it is worth observing that disasters are teachable moments 
which can help build better understanding even if they do not result 
in immediate reforms. They can shed a harsh light on regulatory 
failures and political dysfunctions leading up to disasters. They can 
often highlight the need for corporate accountability that McGarity 
and Steinzor herald. 
As academics, part of our jobs should be to objectively document 
the failures that lead to disasters or amplify harm. We should not 
shrink from proposing solutions, even if the political system may not 
 
 86.  Hiroko Tabuchi, A Confused Nuclear Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2012), at B1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/11/business/global/after-fukushima-disaster-a-confused-effort-
at-cleanup.html?pagewanted=all&_moc.semityn. 
 87.  McGarity & Steinzor, supra note 29, at 137–38.  
 88.  Id. at 145. 
 89.  Id. at 147. 
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be ready to adopt all of them. Finally, whatever work we do to 
improve systems of disaster response and recovery can pay a dividend 
in terms of civic education by showing that government can indeed 
effectively and efficiently assist people when they need help the most. 
A better appreciation of the government’s ability to deliver vital 
services in the aftermath of disasters may indirectly help build 
confidence in the government’s ability to mitigate risks in advance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Appropriate legal structures can ensure that disasters are 
anticipated and contained in a comprehensive and equitable manner. 
Disaster law is a complex, multi-faceted, and rapidly expanding body 
of thought, one that addresses the dire need for a systematic, 
thoughtful approach to managing the chaos of disasters. This 
Symposium makes a notable contribution to that intellectual 
enterprise. 
Disasters, both natural and human-induced, are an increasingly 
common feature of twenty-first century life. Yet, despite some 
improvements, the legal system remains gravely unprepared for the 
next major disaster—the occurrence of which is nothing short of a 
certainty in a world characterized by global warming and complex, 
dangerous technologies. It is therefore incumbent upon legal scholars 
to undertake an intensive effort to examine and reform the 
interlocking structures of governance and regulation that pertain to 
disasters. The Symposium editors have assembled a remarkable 
group of articles in this vein. 
Legal scholarship, such as the articles in this Symposium, is 
beginning to develop a coherent intellectual map of disaster issues 
that will guide the near- and long-term future of disaster law 
scholarship and dialogue. Over time, scholars will further refine and 
explore the wide variety of avenues for research within the field and 
will continue to influence disaster prevention, response, and 
management policy for the better. 
As we have seen, many of the shortcomings in current disaster 
law have surfaced in the Fukushima context. Throughout the cycle of 
disaster, the Japanese legal system has struggled to control risks, 
respond when risks materialize, and provide the financial basis for 
reconstruction. Some of the issues relate specifically to Japanese 
society, but the general problems seem to be universal. Whether 
Japanese or not, we can learn about the needs of our own societies 
from the events in Japan. 
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Scholarship such as this Symposium can shed light on these 
problems and suggest possible cures. We can only hope that society, 
in Japan and elsewhere, uses this teachable moment well, to become 
better prepared for the future.  
